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 What explains differences in the margin of victory in Florida legislative races? Data is 
collected for all 160 legislative races from 2016 (120 house contests and 40 senate elections) and 
two sets of analyses are conducted: all races and just competitive races. When looking at all 
races, five variables are statistically significant in the multivariate model. District party 
registration difference has a positive effect on margin of victory and the greatest relative impact. 
Races involving two major party candidates have a much smaller margin of victory, a contest 
with a major party versus a minor party (or No Party Affiliation candidate) has a somewhat 
smaller margin of victory, and a race involving only a write-in candidate as an opponent has a 
wider margin of victory. House races had somewhat smaller margins of victory compared to 
senate races. When examining just competitive races (contests that had at least two candidate 
names listed for an office) only two variables were statistically significant in the multivariate 
model. District party registration difference had a positive relationship with margin of victory 
and races involving a minor party candidate as the main challenger had higher margins than 
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What explains the difference in vote margin of candidates in the Florida Legislature? 
This is an important question because without competitive elections Florida voters would have 
little meaningful choice in picking legislators and directing public policy. Florida has been called 
a microcosm of the United States due to its diverse population almost matching the racial and 
ethnic percentages of the country as a whole. This diversity has led to Florida being a powerful 
swing state. In recent years Florida has been under the control of the Republican Party, but each 
election there is a chance of a shift in that balance of power. The way the constituents vote for 
members of the Florida House and Florida Senate has an effect on how the state has an impact on 
a national scale. People speak about many factors that they think have an influence on why some 
candidates win and why some candidates do not. Common ones are differences in party 
registration in a district or if there is an incumbent present on the ballot. Redistricting has been a 
hot topic in recent years and the Florida Senate went through a redistricting in 2016 before the 
election cycle that is being studied. The characteristics of the constituents, the contest, and of the 
candidate are also going to come into play. The following theories and literature review will give 
important background knowledge on redistricting, the state legislature and other information on 









To fully understand the differences in vote margin of candidates in the Florida 
Legislature it is essential to know background knowledge on the subject and aspects that may 
influence state politics in Florida. Florida is known as one of the nation’s preeminent 
battleground states. When it comes to nationwide elections, Florida is a barometer in the sense 
that Florida has the ability to change the outcome of an election. Florida has been the largest 
swing state since the 1990s and this is attributed to the state being a microcosm of America 
(MacManus, Dye, Jewett, and Bonanza, 147). What that means is that the state is as diverse as 
the nation. It is made up of people from all ethnic and socioeconomic backgrounds. When it 
comes to state politics in Florida the political parties and elections have been as competitive as 
their national counterparts. For years, the Florida Legislature was dominated by Democrats and it 
was not till the 1960s when Republicans started gaining seats in each house (MacManus, Dye, 
Jewett, and Bonanza, 146). This shift to a true two-party system was the catalyst for the 
competitive nature that is now associated with the state legislature races. The Republicans took 
their first majority in both the Senate and the House in 1996 and this was no surprise due to the 
Republicans slowly catching up to the Democrats each election cycle (MacManus, Dye, Jewett, 
and Bonanza, 146).  
As of now the Republicans still hold the majority in both houses. Going in to the 2018 
elections there are 76 members of the Republican Party and 41 members of the Democratic Party 
in the Florida House of Representatives (Florida House of Representatives). There are 23 
members of the Republican Party and 15 of the Democratic Party in the Florida State Senate 
(The Florida Senate). In 2016 there were 24 competitive state Senate elections and 78 
competitive state House of Representative elections (Florida Department of State). Those 24 
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competitive Senate races and 78 competitive House races will be the focus of this investigation. 
Focusing on competitive races only in hopes that will highlight the main determining factors of 
each election. What is meant by competitive is that there is more than one person running for the 
seat. “It is only in competitive races where the normal campaign related activities, money, 
message, mechanics, make a difference and where variations in these resources can affect the 
outcome (Crew and Bayliss, 145).” If a candidate is running unopposed then the difference in 
vote margin would be explained by the fact that there was not another campaign occurring that 
would take away votes from the candidate instead of other factors, such as money, candidate 
traits, or effects of redistricting that are influential in competitive races.  
In Florida, there are 120 representatives in the state House and they all have two-year 
term limits and can serve up to four consecutive terms or eight years in total. There are 40 state 
Senators and they have four-year term limits and can serve up to eight years or two terms. There 
are exceptions in the state Senate where a Senator can be in office for a total of ten years 
depending on how close they are initially elected to a reapportionment year.  
Legislative reapportionment or otherwise known as redistricting is an important factor 
when it comes to the state legislature. “Every ten years, the United States Census Bureau is 
charged with tracking changes in the nation’s population, as required by article I, Section 2 of the 
U.S. Constitution (Lewis, Jordan).” The changes in population result in a change of the number 
of U.S. Representatives and state legislators. This is done by redrawing the district lines. In 2012 
the population of Florida has grown to almost 19 million people, with heavy growth in the 
Central and Southwest Florida areas (Jewett and McKee, 41). There is a one-person one-vote 
standard that the states are supposed to take into consideration when adjusting the districts after 
the census (Engstrom, Erik). The districts are geographical areas that are represented by the 
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candidate who wins the district. The redrawing of district lines are drawn by the legislatures 
themselves in most states (Levitt, Justin). The responsibility of election administration is 
primarily on the states due to the U.S. Constitution (Engstrom, Erik). The same Constitution that 
gave the states this administrative power did not outline how the districts were to be drawn. This 
opened the door for state politicians to have more control over their political agendas. The 
district lines can change the outcome of elections and in turn who controls the legislature.  
Most research done on redistricting and its affects, focus on electoral outcomes and how 
those outcomes affect the partisan make-up of the state (Hayes and McKee). Historically, there 
have been attempts by legislatures to draw new districts that will benefit their party or the 
districts that they represent. This is done by making new districts that will primarily contain 
voters who are in support of them and their agenda. The partisan attempt of redistricting is 
known as gerrymandering. Redistricting in this way has created uncompetitive elections and 
partisanship (Lewis, Jordan). Some critics have even said that gerrymandering can erode away 
electoral competitiveness to the point of violating equal protections standards in the Constitution 
(Forgette, Garner, and Winkle). Malapportionment was an issue in the twentieth century, 
specifically in rural areas. The population was growing fast, and redistricting was not able to 
keep up with that growth. To fix the consequences of the malapportionment there were radical 
redrawing’s taking place in the 1960s to the congressional and state legislative districts 
(Engstrom, Erik). This sweeping change to the districts brought the judiciary into the 
redistricting process. The role of the courts was and is to make sure that the districts are fair and 
not an attempt to gain partisan control. There have been studies on the historical competitiveness 
of state legislative general elections. As years have passed the percent of uncontested seats has 
increased from 20 percent in 1968 to 39 percent in 2002 (Forgette, Garner, and Winkle, 156). 
This has resulted in a decline in the competitiveness of state legislative elections because a high 
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percent of candidates do not have competition to begin with. The margin of victory over this 
time period has remained stable. There was a slight increase in margin of victory in the 1990s, 
but the absolute value of the margin of victory has remained high with candidates winning by 
almost 25 percentage points (Forgette, Garner, and Winkle, 156). The high percentage of races 
that are unopposed coupled with the high margin of victory has led to this idea that state 
legislative general elections are not competitive. This was a catalyst for why people were looking 
for reform to the redistricting process to work towards making these elections more competitive 
and more inclusive.  
The Fair Districts Amendment was made to require legislators to draw districts that make 
geographic sense and not districts that would help them politically. It prohibited the drawing of 
new district lines with the intent of favoring political parties or incumbents with the intent or 
result of diminishing minority presentation and require districts to be compact and follow 
existing geographic and political boundaries where possible (Jewett and McKee, 42). The 
Amendment was put on the ballot in 2010 and passed with nearly 63 percent of the vote (Lewis, 
Jordan). With the implementation of the Fair Districts Amendment and the population changes in 
the census of 2010 those running in 2012 were campaigning in districts that were different than 
they would have been in 2010. This change resulted in several incumbents retiring and others 
having new competition in their party primaries or general elections (Crew and Anderson). The 
Republican Party had the supermajority in the House and the Senate after the 2012 elections in 
Florida, so they controlled the redistricting process for the next cycle (Jewett and McKee, 53). 
The new districts that were made in 2012 were approved by the Justice Department and the 
Florida Courts, but the Florida Supreme Court required some changes to the original senate map 
(Jewett and McKee, 43). All state legislators are elected by districts and the state legislature 
affects the daily lives of people, whether it be in the taxes that are in place or the regulations in 
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place that determine air quality. The affect these representatives have on their districts and on the 
state of Florida are the reasons why redistricting is an important topic. Illegitimate attempts of 
redistricting are impacting the democratic sense of the state government and impacting the 
citizens of the state. Redistricting does not always get attention. In most cases, the average 
citizen does not realize that it has occurred. There are some cases that disobey that trend. In 
Texas, in 2003, there was an attempt to redraw the district lines for Congress after the court had 
already redrawn the lines a few years prior (Levitt, Justin).  
Redistricting can be a factor in who wins an election, but it is not the only reason a 
candidate wins. Even in the 2012 elections for the state legislature the new districts were 
affecting all of the candidates and there were other factors that determined the outcomes of that 
election cycles. The factors were the elements of legislative behavior, like incumbency success, 
the competitiveness, and party control (Crew and Anderson). Redistricting can have a varying 
degree of impact on an election cycle. When the result of redistricting is districts that are 
primarily representative of one party over the other then that will lead to a larger impact than a 
fair reapportionment cycle where each candidate is affected by the changing of the lines and the 
new areas do not reflect on party or race more than the others.  
Redistricting can also change the relationship between representatives and individual 
campaign contributors. As discussed, districts grow and change depending on population size 
after each census. It is not uncommon for a district to move geographically and thus move away 
from past donors. The effect that this change has on the campaign contributions varies. It has 
been shown that as a district moves geographically the members of that district receives larger 
shares from donors outside of their new area (Crespin and Edwards, 220). When it comes to 
individual donors who are no longer a part of their past district are less likely to support their 
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previous representative, but contributors who are now in a district because of the geographical 
changes are more likely to donate (Crespin and Edwards, 220). It has been observed that 
geography is the most important factor influencing contribution decisions, with the three types of 
contributors being investors, ideologs, and intimates (Francia, Green, Herrnson, Powell, and 
Wilcox). The contributor breakdown of a district coupled with the partisan breakdown of a 
district can impact the vote margin of an election.  
For redistricting to have an effect on a candidate they have to become a candidate first. 
Aside from the three constitutional qualifications that are required in order to be hold a 
congressional office, there is also a recruitment process. It is said that there are formal and 
informal elements to this recruitment process. The formal being the Constitution and state and 
federal laws governing nominations and elections. The informal being ambitions, skills, 
resources and then the popular mood and attitudes at the time (Davidson, Oleszek, Lee, and 
Schickler, 41). These elements coupled together result in the quality of representation that is had 
in the House and the Senate. The candidate process is more than those elements however. The 
decision to run for a political office deals with personal and emotional matters and considerations 
have to take place in order to realize if a one is committed to the process and committed to the 
outcome if they were to win a seat.  
There is a recruiting season where the leaders and campaign staff of the Republican and 
Democrat parties reach out across the country in search of political talent (Davidson, Oleszek, 
Lee, and Schickler, 57). Amateurs and professionals are the two categories that potential 
candidates can be placed. An amateur would have a lack of political experience and 
professionals are career politicians, people whose career is in politics (Davidson, Oleszek, Lee, 
and Schickler, 57-58). Professionals have more to weigh when thinking about running and 
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amateurs are more likely to run for a long shot than are professionals. Many amateurs run for 
Congress, but the most successful congressional candidates are professionals before they run. 
“Candidate quality and campaign strength are critical factors in many battles for congressional 
seats (Davidson, Oleszek, Lee, and Schickler, 59).” A candidate who can present him or herself 
as skilled makes them compelling to voters. Name recognition as seen in the 2016 Presidential 
election with high profile candidates such as Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump and credibility 
are also major factors.  
There are also campaign laws that have an impact on whether or not a candidate ends up 
running for office. Focusing more on campaign finance law because studies have shown that the 
task of fund-raising is a deterrent when it comes to running for office (Hamm, and Hogan, 458). 
When an incumbent is running one view suggests that a challenger is less likely to run if the 
states contribution limits are low (Hamm, and Hogan, 459). It is known that incumbents have a 
high seat retention rate and part of the reason for that success is that it is easier for them to restart 
their campaigns and reach out to donors and contributors they already have on their side than it is 
for challengers who have to essentially start from scratch. Campaign finance laws vary state to 
state. Some may have greater limits on sources of funding than others and some may even 
prohibit direct contributions from corporations (Hamm, and Hogan, 459). A study of races 
involving an incumbent in contested primary and general elections from 1994 to 1998 was done 
of the lower house elections for twenty-five states. It showed that of the 303 elections examined 
in Florida during that time only 25 incumbents faced a challenger in their primary election and 
39 faced a challenger in their general election. When it came to an independent or minority party 
challenging an incumbent that happened in 1 percent of elections during the time period 
specified (Hamm, and Hogan, 462). This data supports the idea that an incumbent is more likely 
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to run in an uncontested election than they are to run in a contested election and that campaign 
finance laws may be an influencing factor.  
The strength of a campaign can come down to stamina. If an incumbent is running that 
changes campaigns all together. Races that do not have an incumbent running are more likely to 
be competitive and to shift party control (Davidson, Oleszek, Lee, and Schickler, 60). Party 
strategists concentrate on these races and this thesis will focus on these competitive races as well. 
The procedures that are involved in party customs helps shape who ends up on the ballot. There 
are laws in each state that determine who is permitted to vote in a party’s primary election. 
Closed primaries aid party loyalty and discourage outsider candidates from running (Davidson, 
Oleszek, Lee, and Schickler, 62). Florida has a closed primary, meaning that one can only vote in 
the primary for the party that they are registered to have an affiliation with. The incumbency 
factor is evident in primaries where an incumbent is running. When there is an incumbent in the 
primary the incumbent has only been defeated 1 percent of the time since the postwar period 
(Davidson, Oleszek, Lee, and Schickler, 62). Open-seat races result in competitive primaries. 
Overall, there is a large pool of people who could run for a seat, but due to the recruitment 
process and nominating process as one gets farther into the pursuit of candidacy the path 
becomes narrower and the pool becomes smaller.  
There are many candidate characteristics that can influence voters. These characteristics 
can include campaign skills, name recognition, integrity, competence, and dedication to public 
service (Adams, Merrill, Simas, and Stone). The personality of a candidate comes out in news 
coverage and other forms of communication. The way the media views a candidate can influence 
what the people think of the them in a positive and negative way. Voters rely heavily on these 
candidate traits when deciding who to cast their vote for and this is even when there is a control 
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for ideology and issue preference (Fridkin, and Kenney). It is expected that voters will vote for 
the party that they are registered as affiliated with, but every election cycle there are some voters 
who do not conform to that norm. The way that a candidate interacts with the media and citizens 
drives the election and determines the outcome (Box-Steffensmeier, Darmofal, and Farrell). A 
candidate can come out on top in some cases due to partisans who defect from their usual voting 
patterns and vote for the opposing party (Herrnson, and Curry). There is debate over whether or 
not issues matter in elections. Policy issues are considered short term forces and campaigns fall 
into this short-term category as well. Research has shown that partisan attachment is the basis for 
vote choice and because there is low-visibility in many state level elections the long-term forces 
are what most believe have the strongest pull on the outcomes (Herrnson, and Curry). Even when 
people are not particularly fond of the candidate that is representing their party typically, they 
will still vote for them. Studies have shown that members of Congress hold more extreme views 
than their constituents which supports the idea that there are differences that the voter puts to the 
side (Bafumi, and Herron, 519). This was also seen in the 2016 Presidential Election. People 
sticking to their party nominee further supports the idea that party affiliation is the best 
predicator of vote choice (Nelson and Mellow, 89). If we can see who someone is likely to vote 
for by their party, then that will have an impact on the vote margin in a given district. If there is 
strong support for one party in a district, then the vote margin should be higher than if it was a 
divided district when it comes to party affiliation. Analyzing the partisan breakdown in districts 
will help show the strength of the relationship between vote margin and party affiliation. This 






THEORIES EXPLAINING DIFFERENCE IN VOTE MARGIN OF 
CANDIDATES IN THE FLORIDA LEGISLATURE 
 
Political Districting:  
This theory suggests that the partisan breakdown of a district has an effect on the vote margin 
between the winning candidate and the runner up. Specifically, the percent of a district affiliated 
with the Republican, Democrat and other parties will have an impact on whether a legislative 
race is close or a blowout. Districts with high percentage of voters identifying with one major 
party are more likely to elect a candidate from their preferred party by a wide margin. Districts 
with an even number of voters from each major party are more likely to have competitive 
elections.  
Constituent Characteristics:  
This theory suggests that the characteristics of the constituents that make-up a district have an 
effect on the vote margin. These characteristics can include the percent of each race and sex that 
are in a district. The median household income and level of education in a district can also have 
an effect. Variations on the percentages can have an impact on why one candidate beats and 
another and by how much.  
Candidate Centered Characteristics:  
This theory suggests that characteristics of the candidates who are running will have an effect on 
the vote margin of the election. These characteristics can include race and sex of the candidates. 




Contest Characteristics:  
This theory suggests that there are certain contest specific characteristics that effect the vote 
margin of the election. The money raised, and the money spent by the candidates have shown to 
have an impact on elections. In addition, whether there is minor party or major party competition 
can have an effect: elections that include one major party candidate against only a minor party 
candidate are likely to have wide margins of victory. Finally, whether the race is for a house or 
senate seat may also make a difference in the margin of victory. House districts are 
geographically smaller and have fewer constituents and may be more homogenous and thus less 
contested, while senate districts are larger, have more constituents and tend to be more 





















Political Districting Variables  
H1 – There is a positive relationship between party registration differences and the vote margin. 
The higher the difference between registration for one party versus another, the higher the vote 
margin. This will include information on the percent of people registered as Republicans, 
Democrats, and those not registered as one of the two major political parties. The party 
registration data will show the partisan breakdowns of each district. If a district is primarily made 
up of registered Republicans versus registered Democrats than the vote margin will be higher.  
Constituent Characteristics  
H2 – There is a positive relationship between racial homogenization and the vote margin. The 
district breakdown of the percent of each race represented will be analyzed to see if there is a 
relationship between more homogeneous districts or diverse districts when it comes to vote 
margin. The more racially homogenous a district is the higher the vote margin. If a racial group 
makes up the majority of the district, then the vote margin will be higher than if there was not a 
majority racial group.  
H3 – The closer the percent of each sex the lower the vote margin. The percent female and male 
for each will be collected and analyzed to have a better understanding of the district breakdown 
and to see if there is a relationship between majority male districts versus majority female 
districts. If a district is split evenly between women and men, then the vote margin is likely to be 
lower due to the differences in opinion. Women are also more likely to be registered as 
Democrats than men, so that may also have an impact on this variable.  
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H4 – There is a positive relationship between the average age of a district and the vote margin. 
The age breakdown of each district will be analyzed to see if there is a relationship between 
districts with an older population versus districts with a younger population when it comes to the 
vote margin. Older populations tend to vote more and follow elections closer than their younger 
counterparts. The older the population the higher the vote margin. Younger or more diverse age 
populations tend to also be more diverse on the political spectrum leading to closer races and in 
turn lower vote margins.  
Candidate Centered Characteristics  
H5 – If both candidates are from the majority race of the district, then the vote margin will be 
lower than if one candidate was not from the majority race. The race or races of the candidates 
running will be analyzed to see if there is a relationship between racial homogenous races and 
races where there are candidates of different races. Essentially if there is a minority candidate 
running or if there is not a minority candidate running. A district that is majority Hispanic and 
has a Hispanic candidate running against a non-Hispanic candidate will have a higher vote 
margin than if two Hispanics were running against each other in that district.  
H6 – If both of the candidates are of the same sex, then the vote margin will be lower than if the 
candidates running were of different sexes. The sex or sexes of the candidates running will be 
analyzed to see if there is a relationship between vote margin when a race only has candidates 
from one sex or when a race has a candidate of each sex. The thought is that in races of 
candidates of different sexes one might be seen as more of an underdog candidate than the other 
based off of that factor.  
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H7 – If there is an incumbent running, then the vote margin will be higher than if it was an open 
seat election. The incumbency advantage is well known and will be analyzed to see if there is a 
relationship between there being an incumbent running versus when an incumbent is not running 
and the vote margin. Incumbents have a high reelection rate and will run unopposed more often 
than first time candidates. Incumbents do not have to start their campaigns from scratch and it is 
usually easy for them to reclaim financial donors. An incumbent running also scares off potential 
opposition since the chance of winning against an incumbent is lower than the chance of winning 
in an open seat election.  
Contest Characteristics  
H8 – There is a positive relationship between the difference in amount of money spent and the 
vote margin. The amount of money spent by each candidate will be analyzed to see if there is a 
relationship between the difference and the vote margin. The higher the difference of total 
money spent between candidates the higher the vote margin. If one candidate spends a large 
amount more than the other candidate, then the vote margin will be higher. Spending more 
results in more exposure which leads to more votes.  
H9 – If both candidates are from one of the major parties, then the vote margin will be lower 
than other types of races (for instance if a minority party, NPA, or write in faces a Republican or 
Democrat). Minority parties do not have as strong party organization or the same funding 
opportunities. The party of each candidate will be analyzed to see if there is a relationship 
between races between majority parties and races with a minority party present. Major party 
candidates will likely have a large number of supporters from their respective party bases turning 
out to vote which should tend to keep races more competitive. 
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H10 – If one candidate is from one of the two major parties and the other candidate is from a 
minor party or non-party affiliated, then the vote margin will be higher than if two major party 
candidates were present but lower than if there was no named competition on the ballot (a write 
in or an uncontested race). The major party candidate will probably have a large base of party 
support that turns out while the non-major party opponent will likely lack such a group of 
supporters. Conversely a minor party or no party affiliated candidate will still be likely to garner 
more votes than a person whose name does not appear on the ballot at all since many voters may 
not even know the name of an official write in candidate and people who don’t like major party 
or the major party candidate will be able to register their disapproval with a vote for the minor 
party or the NPA candidate. 
H11 – If there is a write-in candidate as the only opponent, then the vote margin will be higher 
than if there was another named opposition candidate on the ballot. Write-in candidates do not 
appear on the ballot, so they typically receive less than one percent of the votes. If a candidate’s 
only competition is a write-in candidate, then that is virtually like no competition at all since 
voters see only one name on the ballot and thus that named candidate will likely win a very large 
share of the votes. 
H12 – If only one person files for a legislative seat, then the vote margin will be higher than for 
any other type of race. When someone is running uncontested in Florida their race does not 
actually appear on the ballot and they automatically win and theoretically receive 100% of the 
vote. 
H13– If it is a House race, then the vote margin will be higher than if it is a Senate race. The 
State Legislature is made up of the House and of the Senate. These races differ in size and in the 
competitive nature. The Senate districts are three times the size of the House districts, meaning 
17 
 
that they are larger and more diverse than the House. Both races will be analyzed to see if there 

















METHODOLOGY AND MEASUREMENT 
 
To conduct my analysis, I will do a regression analysis to show the relationship between 
different variables and the effect that they have on the vote margin of candidates in the 2016 
races for the Florida Legislature – both the Florida House and the Florida Senate. I will collect 
the information of the races from the Florida Division of Elections. Two sets of analyses will be 
run: one for all races and one for competitive races where more than one person has filed for a 
seat. This means that the analysis for all races will include 160 races since there are 120 house 
seats and 40 senate seats. Normally, senate races are staggered so that only 20 would be up for 
grabs in any election cycle. However, a court mandated senate redistricting for 2016 resulted in 
elections for all 40 seats. This will allow for a more comprehensive understanding of which 
variables effect vote margin and to what extent.  
Variables  
The dependent variable is the difference in vote margin of candidates running for the same seat 
in the Florida Legislature. Vote Margin is determined by taking the absolute value of the 
difference between the first-place candidate and the runner up candidate. The value will not take 
into consideration the other candidates who may have ran and received votes. My analysis will 
use information from the Florida Division of Elections for the 2016 State Legislature cycle. 
There will be an inverse relationship between the vote margin value and the competitiveness of 
the race, meaning that the lower the value the more competitive the race and the higher the value 
the less competitive the race.  
Independent variables are divided into four categories; political districting, constituent 
characteristics, candidate centered characteristics, and contest characteristics.  
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Political Districting:  
Party Registration Difference – the absolute value of the difference between the percent of 
registered Republicans and Democrats in the district. This information will come from the 
Florida Division of Elections Book Closing Reports from the 2016 General Elections.  
Constituent Characteristics:  
Racial Homogenization – the absolute value of the difference between the percent of the largest 
racial/ethnic group and the 2nd largest racial/ethnic group in the district. Thus, it will be the 
absolute value of the difference between white and black, white and Hispanic, or black and 
Hispanic. This information will come from the Florida Division of Elections 2016 Bookclosing 
Reports.  
Sex – the absolute value of the difference between the percent of males and females in the 
district. This information will come from the United States Census Bureau and from the Florida 
House and Senate Redistricting Statistics.  
Age – the percent of people over the age of 65. This information will come from Florida House 
and Senate Redistricting Statistics.  
Candidate Centered Characteristics:  
Race/Ethnicity – a dummy variable recorded as 0 if both candidates are the same race or ethnic 
group or 1 if candidates are of different races. This information will come from the Florida 
House of Representatives and the Florida Senate websites, along with the Florida Division of 
Elections and additional background research when necessary.  
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Sex – a dummy variable where if both the candidates running are of the same sex, then it will be 
recorded as 0 and if they are not the same sex then it will be recorded as 1. This information will 
be gathered from the Florida Division of Elections.  
Incumbency – a dummy variable where if there is an incumbent it will be recorded as 1 and if 
there is not an incumbent it will be recorded as 0. This information will come from the Florida 
Division of Elections.  
Contest Characteristics:  
Money Spent Difference – the absolute value of money spent by candidate R minus money spent 
by candidate D. This information will come from the Florida Division of Elections Campaign 
Finance Database.  
Major Party Competition – a race between a Republican and a Democrat would constitute a race 
between majority parties. Any other type of race (for instance a Libertarian running against a 
Democrat) that would constitute a different type of contest. Races between the majority parties 
will be coded as 1 and any other type of race as 1. This information will come from the Florida 
Division of Elections.  
Minor Party Competition – if there is a race between a candidate from one of the two major 
parties and a candidate from a minor party or non-party affiliated then that would be considered 
minor party competition. Races with a minor party present will be coded as 1 and races without a 
minor party will be coded as 0. This information will come from the Florida Division of 
Elections.   
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Write-In Competition – if there is an official write-in candidate registered for a contest then that 
would constitute a race with write-in competition. If there is a write-in candidate, then that will 
be recorded as 1 and if there is not a write-in candidate that will be recorded as 0. This 
information will come from the Florida Division of Elections. 
No Competition – if there is only one name on the ballot, then that would be considered a race 
with no competition. Races that have a write-in candidate are considered no competition since 
there is still only one name on the ballot. Races with no competitor will be coded as 1 and races 
with more than one name in the ballot will be coded as 0.  
House or Senate – a dummy variable where a House race will be recorded as 1 and a Senate race 













ANALYSIS OF DATA 
 
EXPLAINING DIFFERENCE IN VOTE MARGIN OF CANDIDATES IN THE 
FLORIDA LEGISLATURE – ALL RACES 
 
UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS  
Table 1: Explaining Vote Margin in All Races - Univariate Analysis 
 Mean Standard Deviation N 
Margin Difference 58.405 41.044 160 
Registration Difference 16.901 14.970 160 
Race/Ethnicity Difference 
District 
47.760 22.518 160 
Sex Difference District 3.079 1.785 160 
% 65 and Older 17.336 7.039 160 
Money Spent Difference 233408.226 229130.346 160 
Major Party N/A N/A 75 
Minor Party N/A N/A 14 
Write-In N/A N/A 14 
Race/Ethnicity Difference 
Candidate 
N/A N/A 29 
Sex Difference Candidate N/A N/A 38 
Incumbent N/A N/A 72 




Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics for the variables examined in all 120 state house 
districts and 40 senate districts, meaning that it includes the 76 uncontested races, so the races 
where there was only one candidate filed and won the race. Out of the 160 districts there were 75 
that contained races between a Republican and a Democrat. There were only 14 races that 
included a candidate from a minor party and then another 14 that contained a write-in candidate. 
There were 29 races where the candidates were of different races or ethnicities and 38 races 
where the candidates identified as different sexes.  There were 72 incumbents running for 
reelection during the election cycle being studied. The mean for margin of victory was 58.4, 
meaning that the average difference between the first and second place candidate was 58.4 
percent. The standard deviation is large being 41, so there is a lot of spread in the difference in 
margin of victory. The difference between registered republicans and registered democrats 
averages out to 16.9, with the standard deviation being 14.97. For the race or ethnicity 
differences of the constituents the mean was 47.76 and the standard deviation was 22.5, so most 
districts had a race that made up almost half the population. The sex difference between 
constituents was small with the average being only 3 percent and the standard deviation was 
1.78, meaning that most districts had small differences between the amount of male and female 
constituents. The difference between the 65 percent of older population was 17.33, with a 
standard deviation of 7. The money spent differences between candidates as expected resulted in 
a large mean of 233408.22 and a standard deviation of 229130.34. There was a large amount of 
variance when it came to the amount spent by candidates, since minor party candidates would 
spend significantly less money than their major party counterparts. Even between two major 




BIVARIATE REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
Table 2: Explaining Vote Margins in All Races - Bivariate Regression Results 
Independent Variable B Standard Error Beta Significance Constant B 
Registration Difference 1.478 .184 .539 .000*** 33.422 
Write-In 45.278 10.942 .313 .000*** 54.443 
Minor Party -23.011 11.373 -.159 .045** 60.418 
Major Party -75.868 2.473 -.925 .000*** 93.968 
No Competition 79.131 1.690 .966 .000*** 20.818 
Race/Ethnicity Difference 
District 
-.279 .143 -.153 .053* 71.721 
Race/Ethnicity Difference 
Candidate 
-31.484 8.070 -.296 .000*** 64.111 
Sex Difference Candidate -29.591 7.278 -.308 .000*** 65.433 
Money Spent Difference -2.761E-5 .000 -.154 .052* 64.850 
65 or older .267 .463 .046 .565 53.777 
Sex Difference District 1.308 1.825 .057 .475 54.377 
Incumbent -1.077 6.542 -.013 .869 58.890 
House Race -4.560 7.509 -.048 .545 61.825 
Significance Levels = ***.01, **.05, *.10          All constants were significant at the .000 level 
 
Table 2 shows the bivariate regression results for all independent variables hypothesized 
to have an impact on the vote margin in all 160 state legislative races. The results showed that 
these variables were significant; registration difference, write in candidate, minor party 
candidate, major party candidate, no competition, racial difference in the district, race difference 
of candidates, sex difference of candidates, and money spent difference.  
When there is no difference in party registration in a district the vote margin is 33.4 
percent. For each one percent increase in difference in party registration there was a 1.48 percent 
increase in the margin of victory. Party registration difference alone explains 29 percent of the 
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variance in vote margin. This supports our initial hypothesis that there would be a positive 
relationship between party registration and vote margin. 
When there was a race that included a write-in candidate as the only opposition, the 
margin of victory increased by 45.3 percent and when there was no write-in candidate the vote 
margin was 54.4 percent. This variable only explains 10 percent of the difference in margin. This 
is in line with our initial hypothesis that the margin of victory would increase when there was 
only a write-in candidate present.  
Races that have a minority party or no party affiliated candidate on the ballot showed a 
23 percent decrease in the margin of victory. When no minor party or no party affiliated 
candidate was on the ballot the margin was 60.4 percent. A minor party candidate only explained 
2.5 percent of the change in vote margin. This is on par with the initial hypothesis since the 
decrease in vote margin when a minor party is present is smaller than the decrease when two 
major party candidates are present. 
If a race contained a candidate from both major parties, as in there was a candidate from 
the Republican Party and a candidate from the Democrat Party then the margin of victory 
decreases by 75.9 percent. When the race does not include a candidate from both major parties 
then the vote margin is 94 percent. Major party candidate explains 86 percent of the difference. 
This supports our initial hypothesis about two major party candidates causing a lower margin of 
victory.  
When only one candidate’s name appears on the ballot (or when a candidate won by 
default because there were no challengers at all) the margin of victory increases by 79 percent. 
When there is more than one name on the ballot the margin is 21 percent. The no competition 
variable explains 93 percent of the variance in the margin of victory. This supports our initial 
hypothesis since having no competition caused the margin of victory to increase and to increase 
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a significant percentage. One would expect this result since when there is no competition at all 
the winner theoretically takes 100% of the vote and if there is only one name on the ballot for the 
voters to choose from then it is likely only a miniscule number of voters actually even know the 
name of the person who has registered as a write-in candidate.  
For each one percent increase in racial and ethnic difference among constituents there is a 
.28 percent decrease in the margin. The larger the racial and ethnic difference is of the 
constituents in a district the smaller the margin of victory becomes. When there is not a 
difference the vote margin is 72 percent. This variable alone only explains 2.3 percent of the 
change in margin. This is the opposite of what our initial hypothesis since the increase in racial 
differences led to a decrease in margin, instead of an increase in margin.  
When the candidates are of difference races or ethnicities the margin decreased by 31.5 
percent. When the candidates were of the same race or ethnicity the margin was 64 percent. The 
race or ethnicity of the candidates explain 9 percent of the variance in vote margin. Again, this is 
the opposite of our initial hypotheses. The initial thought was that the vote margin would be 
higher if the candidates were of different races not lower.  
When the candidates are of different sexes then there was a 29.6 decrease in the margin. 
When the candidates were of the same sex then the margin of victory was 65 percent. The sex of 
the candidates explained 10 percent of the difference in vote margin. Our initial hypothesis 
thought that candidates of the same sex would result in a decrease in vote margin, not the other 
way around.  
The larger the dollar difference between the candidates spending the smaller the margin 
of victory. When the there is no difference in amount spent the margin is 65 percent. Money 
spent only explains 2.4 percent of the variance. Initially the thought was that money spent 
difference was going to result in a positive relationship, meaning that the larger the difference in 
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spending the larger the vote margin. The data surprisingly showed otherwise since it seems that a 
larger dollar difference resulted in a smaller vote margin. There were a few races where one 
candidate spent more by a half a million dollars and then the vote margin was only a couple 
points. These instances of extreme out spending in a few close races might help account for the 
result. 
A series of bivariate regressions showed that these variables were not significant; 65 
percent or older, sex difference, incumbent, and house race. 
The percent of each district that was 65 years old or older did not have a statistically 
significant effect on vote margin. Districts that had larger percentages of 65 and older did not 
have significantly different vote margins than districts with smaller 65 and older populations. 
This does not support our initial hypothesis; the positive relationship is not at the strength that 
was expected.  
The percent difference between males and females in a district did not have an effect on 
the margin of victory. A larger percent of males or females did not cause a significant change in 
the margin. This also did not support our initial hypothesis due to the difference in sex of a 
district not having an impact on the margin of victory.  
The presence or absence of an incumbent candidate did not have a statistically significant 
effect on the vote margin. When there was no an incumbent on the ballot the vote margin was 59 
percent. This surprisingly did not support our initial hypothesis. The redistricting of the Senate in 
2016 might explain this result since there were a number of previous Senators running, but they 
were running in different districts than their prior election.  
There was no difference in competitiveness between House races and Senate Races. The 
difference between the two types of races was not statistically significant enough to have an 
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effect on the margin. This did not support our initial hypothesis since the Senate districts are 
larger the thought was that they would be more competitive than the House races.  
 
FULL MODEL – MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION 
Table 3: Explaining Vote Margin in All Races - Multivariate Regression Results 
Model B Standard Beta t Sig. 
Constant 90.794 4.346  20.891 .000*** 
Registration Difference .261 .073 .095 3.564 .000*** 
Major Party -71.511 2.278 -.872 -31.388 .000*** 
Minor Party -36.273 3.087 -.251 -11.751 .000*** 
Write-In 9.771 3.263 .067 2.995 .003*** 
House Race -5.196 2.552 -.055 -2.036 .044** 
Race Difference 
Candidate 
-2.167 2.351 -.020 -.922 .358 
Sex Difference 
Candidate 
-3.030 2.127 -.032 -1.424 .156 
Race Difference 
District 
-.017 .051 -.009 -.329 .742 
Sex Difference District .153 .483 .007 .317 .752 
% 65 and Older .191 .150 .033 1.274 .205 
Money Spent 
Difference 
1.816E-6 .000 .010 .402 .688 
Incumbent 1.412 1.987 .017 .711 .479 
Significance Levels = ***.01, **.05, *.10 




Table 3 contains the results for the multivariate regression analysis seeking to explain the 
variance in vote margin in all 160 contests. When regression is run on the full model, the full 
model explains almost 94 percent of the variance in margin of victory. The F Change Statistic 
was 189 which shows that the full model was statistically significant. The Durbin-Watson was 
1.94 which indicates that serial correlation was not a problem for the model. All of the variance 
inflation factors were less than two, indicating that multicollinearity was also not a problem in 
this model. The constant for this model indicates that the margin of victory for a race where all 
other variables are set to 0 is 90.79 percent.  
There were five variables that were statistically significant; registration difference, major 
party, minor party, write in and house race. Each one percent increase in the difference between 
registered Republicans and Democrats leads to a 2.61 increase in margin of victory. When there 
was major party competition margin of victory was 71.5 percent smaller. When there was only 
minor party (or NPA) competition on the ballot the margin of victory was also smaller, but only 
by 36 percentage points, about half of what it was for major party. Conversely, when there was 
only a write in candidate the margin of candidate was larger by almost 9.7 percent. House races 
have a 5.19 percent lower margin of victory than Senate races, so the House races are on average 
somewhat more competitive than Senate races. These five variables had roughly the same impact 
in the bivariate regression and they were statistically significant and had the same direction in 
both bivariate and multivariate regression. According to the standardized coefficient the 
statistically significant variable with the largest impact was major party whose beta was -.873. 
Minor party had the second largest impact at -.250. Presence of a write in candidate had an 
impact of .067 and house race had the smallest beta of -.055. Party registration difference as 
expected supported our initial hypothesis. Major and minor party both also as expected supported 
our initial hypothesis about how each would decrease the vote margin. The presence of a write-in 
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also supported our initial thoughts since the vote margin ended up being larger when a write-in 
candidate was present. House races being slightly more competitive did not support our initial 
hypothesis. Since Senate districts are larger the initial thought was that they would be more 
competitive than House races.  
There were seven variables that were not statistically significant; race or ethnicity 
difference among candidates, race or ethnicity difference in the district, sex difference between 
candidates, sex difference in the district, percent of the district 65 or older, money spent 
difference and if there was an incumbent. In a bivariate analysis four of these variables were 
statistically significant; race or ethnicity difference among candidates, race or ethnicity 
















EXPLAINING DIFFERENCE IN VOTE MARGIN OF CANDIDATES IN THE 
FLORIDA LEGISLATURE – COMPETITIVE RACES 
 
UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS  
Table 4: Explaining Vote Margin in Competitive Races - Univariate Analysis 
 Mean Standard Deviation N 
Margin Difference 20.817 14.731 84 
Registration 
Difference 
10.260 9.855 84 
Race/Ethnicity 
Difference District 
50.716 21.429 84 
Sex Difference 
District 
2.990 1.633 84 
% 65 and Older 17.103 5.737 84 
Money Spent 
Difference 
261442.142 182539.308 84 
Minor Party N/A N/A 14 
Race/Ethnicity 
Difference Candidate 
N/A N/A 24 
Sex Difference 
Candidate 
N/A N/A 31 
Incumbent N/A N/A 39 
House N/A N/A 65 
 
  
Table 4 displays the descriptive statistics for the variables examined in the competitive 
races, meaning the races that had at least two candidate names on the ballot. This set of analyses 
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excludes districts where only one candidate filed to run for an office or where the only 
competitive for a major party candidate was an official write-in candidate (because under Florida 
law write-in names do not appear on the ballot). Out of the 160 districts originally studied 84 of 
them were considered competitive. Minor party candidates were present in 14 of the races, which 
is the same number as in the analysis with all races. Candidates were of different races or 
ethnicities in 24 of the races and they identified as different sexes in 31 of the races. There were 
39 incumbents present in this model and that is 33 less than in the All Races model. A decrease 
in that category is expected since incumbents are more likely to run without competition than 
those running for the first time.  Of the 84 competitive races 65 of those were races for seats in 
the House of Representatives. That is surprising since one would think that Senate races would 
have more competition because Senate districts are much larger than House districts. The 
average difference in vote margin was 20.8 percent, with a standard deviation of 14.7. This is a 
lower average and tighter standard deviation than in the all races model. The registration 
difference had a mean of 10.26 and a standard deviation of 9.85, which again is lower than it was 
when all races were included. The mean for racial and ethnic differences of constituents was 50.7 
and the standard deviation was 21.42. The sex difference of constituents was a lot smaller with 
the mean being 2.99 and the standard deviation being 1.63. This difference between sex and race 
is expected since more races are collected than sexes. The average for the percent of the 
population that was 65 or older was 17.1 and the standard deviation was 5.73. The difference in 
money spent between candidates had mean of 261442.14 and a standard deviation of 182539.30. 
This mean is higher than it was in the all races model, but the standard deviation is lower than it 





Table 5: Explaining Vote Margin in Competitive Races - Bivariate Regression Results 
Independent Variable B Standard Error Beta Significance Constant B 
Registration Difference 1.056 .177 .706 .000*** 9.987 
Minor Party 32.081 3.519 .709 .000*** 16.999 
Money Spent Difference -1.582E-2 .000 -.196 .074* 24.953 
Race/Ethnicity 
Difference Candidate 
-3.064 3.564 -.095 .392 21.693 
Sex Difference 
Candidate 
.933 3.350 .031 .781 20.474 
Incumbent 2.470 3.231 .084 .447 19.671 
Race/Ethnicity 
Difference District 
-.073 .075 -.107 .333 24.545 
Sex Difference District .314 .996 .035 .753 19.879 
% 65 and Older .200 .283 .078 .480 17.389 
House Race 1.424 3.862 .041 .713 19.716 
Significance Levels = ***.01, **.05, *.10 
All constants were significant at the .000 level, except % 65 or older was at the .001 level. 
 
 Table 5 shows the bivariate regression results for all independent variables hypothesized 
to have an impact on the vote margin in all 84 of the competitive state legislative races. The 
results showed that these variables were significant: registration difference, minor party, and 
money spent difference. 
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 When there was no difference in party registration the vote margin was about 10 percent. 
For every percent increase in party registration difference there was a 1 percent increase in vote 
margin. This variable alone explains 49.9 percent of the variance in margin of victory.  
 When there is not a minor party candidate on the ballot the vote margin is about 17 
percent. When there is a minor party candidate the margin of victory increases by 32 percent. 
This explains 50.3 percent of the change in vote margin.  
 When there was no difference in amount of money spent between the candidates the vote 
margin was 24.9 percent. The vote margin decreases slightly for each dollar increase in 
difference spent. Money spent difference only explains 3.8 percent of the difference in margin of 
victory. This result is opposite what was hypothesized since the expectation was that as the 
difference in money spent between the candidates increases so would the margin of victory. 
 A series of bivariate regressions showed that these variables were not significant; race or 
ethnicity difference of the candidates, sex difference of the candidates, incumbent, race or 
ethnicity difference in the district, sex difference in the district, percent 65 and older, and house 
race. 
 The difference in race or ethnicity of the candidates did not have a statistically significant 
effect on the vote margin. If both candidates were of the same race or if the candidates were 
difference races did not have a significant impact on the margin of victory.  
 The sex difference of candidates did not have a statistically significant effect on the 
margin of victory. There was not a real difference between races that had two candidates who 
identified as the same sex or two candidates who identified as different sexes.   
 The presence or absence of an incumbent in a race did not have a significant effect on the 
vote margin. The margin of victory was not affected by having an incumbent in the race or not 
having an incumbent in the race. Since this analysis is from competitive races only that could 
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have had an effect on the significance of an incumbent. Incumbents tend to run uncontested more 
than other candidates, so many incumbents might not be accounted for in this dataset.  
 The difference in races or ethnicities of the constituents in a district did not have an effect 
on the margin of victory. Districts with large differences between races and districts with small 
differences between races had similar vote margins.  
 The difference in sex of constituents did not have a statistically significant effect on the 
margin of victory. Having a larger margin between men and women in a district does not cause a 
larger or smaller vote margin. 
 The percent of the constituents that are 65 or older did not have a significant impact on 
the margin. Districts that had larger percentages of 65 and older did not have significantly 
different vote margins than districts with smaller 65 and older populations. 
 The type of race did not have a statistically significant effect on the margin of victory. 
House and Senate races did not have differences in competitiveness. More of the competitive 
races were House races but looked at all together there was not a trend of House races having 









FULL MODEL – MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION  
Table 6: Explaining Vote Margin in Competitive Races - Multivariate Regression Results 
Model B Standard Beta t Sig. 
Constant .766 4.935  .155 .877 
Registration Difference .854 .112 .571 7.655 .000*** 
Minor Party 22.361 3.092 .495 7.232 .000*** 
Race Difference 
Candidate 
.059 2.036 .002 .029 .977 
Sex Difference 
Candidate 
-1.059 1.894 -.035 -.559 .578 
Incumbent 2.355 2.066 .080 1.140 .258 
Race Difference 
District 
.041 .057 .059 .709 .481 
Sex Difference District .118 .569 .013 .208 .836 
% 65 and Older .099 .200 .039 .497 .620 
Money Spent 
Difference 
7.747E-6 .000 0.96 1.261 .211 
House Race 2.279 2.818 .065 .809 .421 
Significance Levels = ***.01, **.05, *.10 
R Square = .741  F Change = 20.877  Durbin-Watson = 2.308 
 
Table 6 contains the results for the multivariate regression analysis seeking to explain the 
variance in vote margin in all 84 competitive contests. When regression is run on the full model, 
the model explains 74 percent of the variance. The F Change statistic is 20.87, so the model is 
statistically significant. The Durbin-Watson was 2.308, meaning that serial correlation was not a 
problem for the model. All of the variance inflation factors were less than two, indicating that 
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multicollinearity was also not a problem in this model. The constant for this model indicates that 
the margin of victory for a race where all other variables are set to 0 is 76.6 percent. 
 There were two variables that were statistically significant; party registration difference 
and minor party. For each one percent increase in the difference between registered Republicans 
and registered Democrats there is an 8.54 percent increase in vote margin. When there was a 
minor party candidate the margin of victory increased by 22.3 percent. These two variables were 
also statistically significant and had a similar impact, and direction in the bivariate regression as 
they did in the multivariate regression. According to the standardized coefficient party 
registration difference had a larger impact at .571 to the .495 of minor party. The results in both 
these instances are consistent with the hypothesized relationship. 
 There were eight variables that were not statistically significant; race difference of the 
candidates, sex difference of the candidates, incumbent, race difference in the district, sex 
difference in the district, percent 65 and older, money spent difference, and house race. In a 
bivariate analysis one of these eight variables were statistically significant; money spent 


















 The aim of my research was to explain the differences in vote margin of candidates in the 
Florida Legislature. Information was collected on all 120 house districts and all 40 senate 
districts from the 2016 general election. I intended to see which variables had a significant 
impact on the vote margin and which did not have a significant impact. Political districting, 
constituent characteristics, candidate centered characteristics, and contest characteristics were 
collected and inputted into a spreadsheet. Two spreadsheets were created; one contained all 160 
districts and the other contained the districts that were considered to have competitive races. A 
competitive race was an election that had at least two names on the ballot. There were 84 
competitive races by that definition. Using IBM SPSS software, a univariate analysis, a bivariate 
regression, and multivariate regression was done on both models, resulting in six sets of analysis 
total.  
 The all races model showed that nine of the variables were statistically significant in the 
bivariate regression; registration difference, write in candidate, minor party candidate, major 
party candidate, no competition, racial difference in the district, race difference of candidates, 
sex difference of candidates, and money spent difference. Five of the variables were statistically 
significant in the multivariate regression; registration difference, major party, minor party, write 
in and house race.  
The competitive races model showed that three of the variables were statistically 
significant in the bivariate regression; registration difference, minor party, and money spent 
difference. There were only two variables that were statistically significant in the multivariate 
regression; party registration difference and minor party. 
The all races model resulted in more statistically significant variables in both regressions 
than the competitive races model. This was expected since there were 76 less races being 
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analyzed in the competitive model. Party registration difference and minor party were the two 
variables that were statistically significance in all four regressions. This was not surprising, but 
what was surprising was that there were only two variables that were significant in each 
regression. It was thought that money spent difference and the presence or absence of an 
incumbent was going to explain more of the variance in vote margin.  
The all races model showed that four variables were not statistically significant in the 
bivariate regression; percent 65 or older, sex difference in the distort, incumbent, and house race. 
Seven of the variables were not statistically significant in the multivariate regression; race or 
ethnicity difference among candidates, race or ethnicity difference in the district, sex difference 
between candidates, sex difference in the district, percent of the district 65 or older, money spent 
difference and if there was an incumbent.  
The competitive races model showed that seven of the variables were not statistically 
significant in the bivariate regression; race or ethnicity difference of the candidates, sex 
difference of the candidates, incumbent, race or ethnicity difference in the district, sex difference 
in the district, percent 65 and older, and house race. Eight variables were not statistically 
significant in the multivariate regression; race difference of the candidates, sex difference of the 
candidates, incumbent, race difference in the district, sex difference in the district, percent 65 and 
older, money spent difference, and house race. 
 All together these results show that party registration difference has the biggest impact on 
the margin of victory. The difference in registered Republicans and registered Democrats in a 
district largely determines how competitive the race is going to end up. The most competitive 
races were between districts that were evenly divided between the two major parties. The 
candidate characteristics and the constituent characteristics did not matter.  The presence or 
absence of an incumbent ended up not mattering. Differences in money spent only had an effect 
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in the bivariate regressions and type of race only mattered in the all races multivariate model. 
One reason that money spent difference results did not turn out as initially hypothesized might be 
that the amount of money spent by the challengers is the most important variable rather than the 
gross difference between the candidates. Some research has shown that because incumbents have 
an advantage in name recognition and campaign contributions, challengers have to raise and 
spend a lot of money in order to raise awareness among voters. Successful challengers may still 
be outspent, but will have raised and spent a sufficient amount of money to get their name and 
message out to the public. It may also be that money and incumbency are factors that help decide 
who wins a race, but have little or no direct effect on the closeness of the race. 
 This research does cover all 160 districts in Florida, but that is also a shortcoming due to 
the data only covering the 2016 election cycle and only in the state of Florida. Additional 
research on more than one election year and more than one state could prove helpful in 
understanding what explains the differences in vote margin of candidates in state legislatures 
overall, not just in Florida. Since there was an unorthodox midyear redistricting in the Senate in 
2016 that caused all of the seats to be up for elections instead of the usual half. The new districts 
also caused many incumbents to technically run in a different district than they had run in 
previously, which might explain the lower than expected impact of the presence or absence of an 
incumbent. This election cycle was also during a presidential election year, so it might be 
interesting to analyze data from a non-presidential election year and see if that has an impact on 
the results. In addition, given that Donald Trump was a maverick candidate who ran an 
unconventional campaign in 2016, it might be useful to analyze other presidential election years 
as well. Further research on competitiveness might also be conducted on the decision by major 
parties to contest a particular race with the dependent variable measures as a dummy variable: 
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“1” for races with two major party candidates and “0” for contests with only one major party 
candidate. 
 In the future, this research could be expanded to look at multiple election years in Florida 
and then look at multiple election years in other states as well. Starting with neighboring states 
such as Georgia and Alabama might open the door for seeing if there are regional differences in 
which variables have an effect on the margin of victory. Seeing how Florida compares to other 
preeminent swing states like Ohio could also prove to be an interesting analysis. Another 
possible factor that could be added in the future is replacing the current money spent difference 
variables with one that looks at the amount spent by the challenger. The thought there is to see if 
that measure would show different results than the current measure of the absolute value of the 
money spent differences between the candidates. Adding a third model that only contains the 
competitive races that include a Republican and a Democrat candidate could be interesting to see 
if some of the other variables become statistically significant in those types of races. Candidate 
centered, and contest characteristics did not have a direct impact on the vote margin according to 
the current models, so controlling for just races that contain the two major parties might help 
bring out those variables. 
 The takeaway from this research is that despite initial thoughts about the potential impact 
of candidate and constituent characteristics on vote margin, party registration differences and the 
presence or absence of major or minor party competition largely explain the differences in 
margin of victory of candidates in the Florida Legislature. Party registration differences are 
directly affected by redistricting and the presence or absence of major or minor party competition 
is indirectly impacted by redistricting decisions. This showcases the stakes of the upcoming 
redistricting after the 2020 census and highlights the importance of following the guidelines set 
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out in the Florida Fair District constitutional amendments to ensure that new districts are not 
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